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Abstract— With the growth and accessibility of mobile de-
vices and internet, the ease of posting and sharing content
on social media networks (SMNs) has increased exponentially.
Many users post images that contain “privacy leaks” regarding
themselves or someone else. Privacy leaks include any instance
in which a transfer of personal identifying visual content is
shared on SMNs. Private visual content (images and videos)
exposes intimate information that can be detrimental to your
finances, personal life, and reputation. Private visual content
can include baby faces, credit cards, social security cards,
house keys and others. The Hawaii Emergency Agency example
provides evidence that visual content privacy leaks can happen
on an individual or organization level. We find that monitoring
techniques are essential for the improvement of private life
and the development of future techniques. More extensive and
enduring techniques will allow typical users, organizations, and
the government to have a positive social media footprint.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Pew Research Center, 79 percent of Amer-
icans online use Facebook, 32 percent of Americans online
use Instagram, and 24 percent of Americans online use Twit-
ter [1]. Any content posted to social media networks (SMNs)
can be lost to someone else even after removal of the content.
Stolen visual content can then be used as a transport vector
for other types of cyber-attacks or social engineering [2]. In
one famous example, the Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency released photo on Twitter that has raised several
questions about the organization’s cybersecurity policies and
awareness [3]. In the Figure 1, it is noted that one of the
monitors display a post-it note with a password (Figure 1.3).
Fig. 1. Hawaii Emergency Agency [3]
This photo also exposes the location of the cameras
(Figure 1.1) which could lead to vandalism and burglary,
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a phone list (Figure 1.2) which could lead to identity theft
and harassment, and the badge of the employee (Figure 1.4)
which could lead to stalking/impersonation [4].
II. GOALS
In this work, we investigate (1) how pervasive social
media-based privacy visual content leaks are and (2) what
reasonable mitigation strategies can be developed to detect
and minimize these leaks. We use deep learning techniques to
identify “private” information. We propose and incorporate
a privacy scoring metric to gauge a typical user’s privacy
leaks,which computes an individual user’s probable exposure
regarding their visual content leaks [5], [6]. On SMNs,
content can be without any pre-screening or post-screening
procedures, with this proposed procedure we are implement-
ing screening mitigation techniques that will secure users’
information. This endeavour will help us monitor visual
content from SMNs for consumer privacy and protection.
This research will subsequently protect everyday users from
invasions of privacy, whether the action is accidental or
intentionally made.
III. METHOD
A. Categories
Private visual content exposes intimate information that
can be detrimental to our finances, personal life, and repu-
tation. Private visual content can include baby faces, credit
cards, phone numbers, social security cards, house keys and
others. To further assess the sensitivity of visual content, we
have allocated these items into three categories.
1) Location: An attacker can use this vector to find
out where an individual lives and/or current location. The
dangers of this include burglary, stalking, and kidnapping.
Suggested methods to protect this information is to blur,
black out, or to provide generic information. Examples
include letters and phone numbers.
2) Identity: An attacker can use this vector to exploit
an individual’s identity, even to the very intimate details.
The dangers of this include identity theft, financial threat,
burglary. Proposed methods used to protect this informa-
tion is to black out, blur, or provide dummy information
(Jane Doe, 00-00-0000...). Examples include birth certificate,
drivers license, and passports.
3) Asset: An attacker can use this vector to exploit an
individual’s possessions and valuables. The dangers include
financial threat, burglary, stalking, digital kidnapping, and
online defamation. Proposed methods to protect this infor-
mation are to blur and use dummy information (1234 4596
0000). Examples include baby faces, debit cards and keys.
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B. Mitigation Techniques
Given the various categories and examples in which visual
content can be exploited, we are building a Visual Content
Privacy Leak (VCPL) system that will further help us un-
derstand those risks and mitigate them. Our system collects
data from SMNs (by crawling on social media and saving
visual content), and then uses machine learning/deep learning
object detection techniques to identify potential privacy leaks
in the content collected. Using this system, we plan to build
SMN clones that aim to score severity of privacy leaks on
visual content per individual basis. To do so, we are are
implementing the following seven mitigation techniques:
Technique 1 - Client side (Figure 2a). A user can download
a third-party application with various SMN applications on
electronics to prevent the user from posting potential leaks.
This third-party application will pre-screen visual content
(images, videos) before it can be posted on SMNs.
Technique 2 - Privacy Patrol (Figure 2b). This SMN crawler
will randomly look at a user’s pages, screening for privacy
leaks and alerting the user of various potential leaks.
Technique 3 - Chaperone bot (Figure 2c). A user can add
a chaperone bot as a friend on SMNs. The chaperone bot
will give the user friendly suggestions based on type and
frequency of privacy leaks on SMNs.
Technique 4 - Category Tagging (Figure 2d). A user can
select the category that the visual content belongs to before
being uploaded to SMNs. Once tagged, an automated system
will check for content compliance with tag. If it does not fit
the category, the user is notified of new category tag options.
Technique 5 - Privacy Score (Figure 2e). The user will be
monitored based a privacy score. The bot will monitor the
user’s content after posting. In this case, a person who has
a higher privacy score will be monitored more closely than
some one who has a lower score.
Technique 6 - Server side (Figure 2f). The SMN will screen
visual content before uploading to platform. We suggest
collaboration with SMNs to provide enforcement of user
compliance and techniques.
Technique 7 - Interception (Figure 2g). With the SMN
applications, users will agree to let the SMN intercept the
camera and gallery to flag and block content that should not
be selected for posting.
Fig. 2. The location of each proposed mitigation technique.
C. Redaction Techniques
Users may want to share images but hide all or parts
of their images. Web crawling systems may be collecting
baby faces, credit card information for nefarious reasons.We
propose a spectrum of techniques to obfuscate images from
users or machines (Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Spectrum of visual content redaction techniques
Once a visual content privacy leak is detected, we can
handle it in various ways. The first option is to block
the picture. This will remove the content and/or the user’s
affiliation with the content from SMNs. The second option is
use a censor. Censoring is essentially removing a person or
object from a visual content and it will insert a blank space
where the object once existed. The third option is to blur
content. Blurring the content will allow the user to have some
control over what is being seen without causing too much
distortion. The surrounding objects will still remain visible
and the leaked object will be less visible but not removing
them. The fourth option is to use adversarial noise [7]. We
believe that adversarial noise will be important feature added
to visual content to help protect SMNs user from computer
attacks. By adding a few pixels, we could (1) impede their
ability to learn anything from the visual content even if it
is in their possession, and (2) still allow the images to be
visible to humans.
IV. CONCLUSION
As SMNs continue to grow in popularity, they become a
powerhouse for privacy leakage due to the change in social
culture, development of features, and audience. This research
will impact everyday users and non-users of SMNs by pro-
viding a mechanism to identify sensitive information found
in visual content posted on SMN. With the improvements in
identifying and understanding privacy leaks on SMNs, we
can lower the amount of malicious, financial and personal,
attacks made on these platforms.
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